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I. INTRODUCTION 
When is a criminal conviction final?  Oftentimes the answer is not 
“when a guilty plea is entered” or when “an appellate court affirms the 
conviction.”  Welcome to the world of habeas corpus petitions and state 
collateral review, where imprisoned defendants can litigate their 
convictions for years and sometimes even decades after the trial.  This 
Article will focus on the part of criminal law that is rarely covered on 
television: specifically, what happens after a defendant is convicted and 
sentenced?  I will attempt to flesh out the intricacies of criminal 
appellate, postconviction, and collateral proceedings, and in the process, 
hopefully provide clarification in a dense and complicated area of the 
law.  Additionally, this Article will pay special attention to claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in these types of proceedings.  I note at 
the outset that while at times I will discuss the federal system, my focus 
is primarily Wisconsin-based.  The aim here is to provide a practical 
guide to attorneys who must navigate through the hornet’s nest that is 
criminal postconviction litigation.  
The Article is organized as follows.  Section II provides a brief 
background on petitions for writs of habeas corpus.  Section III 
discusses Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06, the statute that was 
designed to replace habeas corpus in Wisconsin.  Section IV traces the 
limits placed on section 974.06 claims, the revival of habeas petitions in 
Wisconsin, and also discusses how postconviction counsel differs from 
appellate counsel and why this difference is procedurally significant.  
Finally, Sections V and VI will discuss recent developments in this area 
of the law and how Wisconsin criminal procedure could be affected by a 
pair of recent United States Supreme Court decisions.   
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II. BACKGROUND ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Habeas corpus, Latin for “that you have the body,”1 is one of the 
bedrock principles of Anglo-American law.2  While habeas corpus 
comes in a variety of forms, this Article concerns the “inquiry into 
illegal detention with a view to an order releasing the petitioner.”3  The 
writ of habeas corpus “is of immemorial antiquity,” stretching all the 
way back to England’s Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.4  A full discussion of 
the history of the writ in England would be both pedantic and 
supererogatory, but suffice it to say, “It is perhaps the most important 
writ known to the constitutional law of England.”5 
Article I, Section Nine of the United States Constitution provides, 
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, 
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it.”6  The power of federal courts to issue the writ for federal 
prisoners derives from Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.7  Similar 
to the federal system, the writ of habeas corpus is enshrined in both 
Wisconsin’s constitution8 and its statute books.9   
Despite the increasing federalization of criminal law,10 most criminal 
cases remain in state courts.11  A state prisoner who brings a habeas 
claim resting solely on a violation of his state constitutional or statutory 
rights is limited to pleading his case in state courts.12  If, however, a state 
 
1.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 825 (10th ed. 2014).   
2.  Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399–400 (1963). 
3.  Id. at 399 n.5.  This form of habeas is known as “habeas corpus ad subjiciendum,” or 
“that you have the body to submit to.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 825 (10th ed. 2014).   
4.  Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2. (Eng.); Sec’y of State for Home Affairs v. 
O’Brien, [1923] A.C. 603 (H.L.) 609 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
5.  O’Brien, [1923] A.C. 603 (H.L.) at 609. 
6.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
7.  Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165, 1188.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (2012) for the current statutory codification of the writ. 
8.  WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended unless, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.”). 
9.  See WIS. STAT. § 782 (2013–2014).   
10.  See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998), available at http://www.americanbar.org/c
ontent/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/Federalization_of_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BV6V-YSN4; see also HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE 
FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT (2009). 
11.  Gregory J. O’Meara, S.J., “You Can’t Get There From Here?”: Ineffective Assistance 
Claims in Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 545, 549 (2009). 
12.  Id. at 549–50. 
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prisoner alleges that his detention also violates his rights under the 
United States Constitution, the prisoner may file his case anew in 
federal court after he has exhausted his state appellate remedies.13  To 
qualify for habeas corpus relief in Wisconsin, the petitioner must be 
“restrained of personal liberty.”14  Relying on federal case law, 
Wisconsin courts have held that a restraint of personal liberty occurs not 
only when an individual “is in actual physical custody,” but also when 
someone is “subject to restraints not shared by the public generally.”15   
Because both the United States16 and Wisconsin Constitutions17 
provide for the right to counsel, a state prisoner in Wisconsin who 
alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel may proceed with 
his claim in federal court if he is unsuccessful at the state level.18  
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that once the state 
court system has determined that a defendant did not receive ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a federal court’s review of the claim is “doubly 
deferential.”19  “The question ‘is not whether a federal court believes the 
state court’s determination’ under the Strickland[20] standard ‘was 
incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a 
substantially higher threshold.’”21 
III. BACKGROUND ON WISCONSIN STATUTES SECTION 974.06 
In 1969, Wisconsin added Chapter 974 to its criminal procedure 
code.22  Shortly after the new statute was enacted, then-assistant public 
defender (and future dean of Marquette University Law School) 
 
13.  Id. at 550. 
14.  WIS. STAT. § 782.01(1). 
15.  State ex rel. Wohlfahrt v. Bodette, 95 Wis. 2d 130, 133–34, 289 N.W.2d 366, 367 (Ct. 
App. 1980). 
16.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).   
17.  WIS. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right to be heard by himself and counsel.”); see also State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 226, 
548 N.W.2d 69, 72 (1996) (holding that the federal and Wisconsin constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing the right to counsel “are substantially similar, and are to be interpreted 
identically”). 
18.  See O’Meara, supra note 11, at 550. 
19.  Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). 
20.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that in order for a 
defendant to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel he must show that (1) 
counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) counsel’s deficiency prejudiced the defendant).   
21.  Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123 (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). 
22.  Act of Nov. 25, 1969, 1969 Wis. Act. 255, § 63, 1969 Wis. Sess. Laws, 602, 667–71. 
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Howard Eisenberg wrote a tour d’horizon in the Marquette Law Review 
outlining how the added provisions would affect criminal procedure in 
Wisconsin.23  As Eisenberg stated, “One of the most important 
innovations of the 1969 revision of the criminal procedure code was the 
adoption of a comprehensive post-conviction remedy statute which is 
codified as [Wisconsin Statutes] section 974.06.”24  Section 974.06 was 
“designed to replace habeas corpus as the primary method in which a 
defendant can attack his conviction after the time for [an] appeal has 
expired.”25  While both habeas and section 974.06 proceedings are civil 
in nature,26 a section 974.06 motion differs from a habeas petition in that 
it is not a new action but rather “simply an additional motion made in 
the existing criminal action.”27 
After the time for appeal or postconviction relief found in Wisconsin 
Statutes section 974.02 has expired, an imprisoned defendant may bring 
a section 974.06 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence if he 
contends that (1) his sentence violates the U.S. or Wisconsin 
Constitutions, (2) the court imposing the sentence lacked jurisdiction, or 
(3) his sentence exceeded the maximum time set by law or is otherwise 
subject to collateral attack.28 
IV. THE CREATION OF WISCONSIN STATUTES SECTION 974.06 AND ITS 
EFFECT ON HABEAS CLAIMS 
A. Limitations on Section 974.06 Actions 
Both the legislature and the courts have placed limits on a prisoner’s 
ability to bring motions under Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06.  
Section 974.06(4), which, aside from a few minor stylistic changes, has 
remained unchanged since 1969, provides: 
 All grounds for relief available to a person under this section 
must be raised in his or her original, supplemental or amended 
motion.  Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other 
 
23.  Howard B. Eisenberg, Post-Conviction Remedies in the 1970’s, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 69 
(1972). 
24.  Id. at 78. 
25.  Id. at 79. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
28.  WIS. STAT. § 974.06(1) (2013–2014).   
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proceeding the person has taken to secure relief may not be the 
basis for a subsequent motion, unless the court finds a ground for 
relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended 
motion.29 
This language has been analyzed in numerous appellate court 
opinions, most significantly in State v. Escalona-Naranjo.30  In that case, 
Barbaro Escalona-Naranjo was convicted of multiple drug charges.31  
After he was sentenced, Escalona-Naranjo filed a motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to section 974.02 with the circuit court 
requesting a new trial, a competency redetermination, and 
resentencing.32  The circuit court denied the motion and the court of 
appeals affirmed.33 
With his direct appellate remedies extinguished, Escalona-Naranjo 
filed a Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06 motion in circuit court alleging 
that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.34  The circuit 
court dismissed the motion, concluding that Escalona-Naranjo was 
simply rephrasing issues that he had already raised in his postconviction 
motion and in his appeal.35  The court of appeals certified the case to the 
supreme court, stating that “even though Escalona-Naranjo waived 
certain evidentiary issues because he did not object at trial, the [section] 
974.06 motion may have raised new issues not decided on direct 
appeal.”36 
Before the supreme court, Escalona-Naranjo argued that his failure 
to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel in either his motion for a 
new trial or on direct appeal did not preclude him from raising the issue 
in his Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06 motion because his claim was 
based on a constitutional right.37  Escalona-Naranjo relied on Bergenthal 
v. State, which held that a court must always consider constitutional 
claims in a section 974.06 motion, even those that were forfeited on 
 
29.  Id. § 974.06(4). 
30.  185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994).   
31.  185 Wis. 2d at 173–74.   
32.  Id. at 174.   
33.  Id. at 174–75.   
34.  Id. at 175. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at 180. 
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direct appeal.38  The court in Escalona-Naranjo overruled Bergenthal, 
holding that a defendant may not raise an issue in his section 974.06 
motion that was finally adjudicated, waived, or forfeited, unless he can 
provide a “sufficient reason” for why the issue was not raised in the 
“original, supplemental or amended motion.”39  The court’s holding was 
based on the need for “finality in . . . litigation.”40  Section 974.06 does 
not give a defendant a license to raise some constitutional issues on 
direct appeal and strategically wait a few years to raise additional 
issues.41  Instead, all constitutional issues should be part of the original 
proceeding, barring a “sufficient reason” for not raising them.42 
Escalona-Naranjo’s “sufficient reason” holding has remained the 
standard for section 974.06 proceedings for two decades,43 although it 
has been refined over the years.  For example, in State v. Allen the 
supreme court held that for a defendant filing a section 974.06 motion to 
successfully obtain an evidentiary hearing, a court first must “determine 
whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient material facts that, if 
true, would entitle the defendant to relief. . . .  If the motion raises such 
facts, the circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing.”44  The court 
qualified this test, however, by noting that if the motion presented only 
“conclusory allegations” or “if the record conclusively demonstrates that 
the defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the discretion 
to grant or deny a hearing.”45  As to what a defendant must plead to 
show “sufficient material facts,” the court laid down the “who, what, 
where, when, why, and how” test.46  More specifically, a section 974.06 
motion that provides “the name of the witness (who), the reason the 
witness is important (why, how), and facts that can be proven (what, 
where, when)” would meet the standard.47 
 
38.  72 Wis. 2d 740, 748, 242 N.W.2d 199, 203 (1976). 
39.  Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 181–82 (quoting language from WIS. STAT. 
§ 974.06(4) (1991–1992)). 
40.  Id. at 185. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 185–86. 
43.  The supreme court reaffirmed the Escalona-Naranjo opinion nearly a decade later 
in State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756, with only Chief Justice 
Abrahamson voting to overturn it.  2003 WI 107, ¶ 108 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
44.  2004 WI 106, ¶ 9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433.   
45.  Id.  
46.  Id. ¶ 23.   
47.  Id. ¶ 24.   
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B. The Revival of Habeas Corpus in Wisconsin 
While Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06 was designed to replace 
habeas corpus in Wisconsin, the legislature has never repealed the 
habeas corpus statute,48 and Wisconsin’s constitution still provides that 
“[t]he privilege of . . . habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless, in 
cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.”49  Habeas, 
however, was largely dormant in this state in the aftermath of Wisconsin 
Statutes section 974.06 until the supreme court revived it in State v. 
Knight.50  The sole question presented for determination in Knight was 
“the proper procedure by which a defendant may assert a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.”51  The State argued that the 
claim should be filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “to the 
appellate court that considered the appeal,”52 while the defendant 
averred that such a claim is properly filed as a section 974.06 motion 
with the circuit court.53  In deciding this matter of first impression, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the federal courts of appeals and 
other state supreme courts were divided on whether claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel should originate in the trial court or the 
appellate courts.54  The courts that held that such claims should be filed 
with the trial courts reasoned that “the trial court passes not on the 
appellate court’s decision, but only on the conduct of the counsel who 
presented the appeal.  Furthermore, the appellate court is not bound by 
the trial court’s decision; the appellate court may review the trial court’s 
decision on appeal by either party.”55   
 
48.  See WIS. STAT. § 782 (2013–2014).   
49.  WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
50.  168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).   
51.  Id. at 514.   
52.  Id. at 512.  Knight repeatedly used the phrase “the appellate court that considered 
the appeal,” which in most cases is the court of appeals.  See, e.g., id. at 518, 520–22.  A 
defendant may, however, file a writ of habeas corpus with the Wisconsin Supreme Court if 
the alleged ineffectiveness of appellate counsel occurred at the high court rather than the 
court of appeals.  See State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 195 Wis. 2d 1, 6–7, 535 N.W.2d 459, 
461 (Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that the supreme court, not the court of appeals, 
should hear a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that appellate counsel was 
ineffective in preparing a petition for review), rev’d on other grounds, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 548 
N.W.2d 45 (1996).   
53.  Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 514.   
54.  Compare id. at 515 n.3, with id. at 517 n.5.   
55.  Id. at 516–17 (citations omitted) (citing Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th 
Cir. 1989); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 371 A.2d 468, 475 (Pa. 1977)).   
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By contrast, other courts have come to the opposite conclusion, 
determining that “the appellate court that rendered the decision in the 
appeal is in the best position to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel.”56  To begin with, “[t]hese courts view the 
postconviction remedy in the trial courts as designed to set aside a 
sentence only for infirmities arising during the trial proceedings.”57  
However, a successful claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, if filed initially in the trial court, would require the trial court to 
set aside an appellate court decision.58  As the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals noted, a trial court “should not have authority to rule 
on the constitutionality of an appellate proceeding.”59  Or as the Tenth 
Circuit has held, “[A] district court lack[s] authority . . . to create 
appellate jurisdiction by directing [a] defendant to file a notice of 
appeal.”60  For these reasons, the appellate court that hears the initial 
appeal is in the best position to “judge the conduct of appellate 
counsel.”61 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the “question of 
the appropriate forum and procedure is a close one,”62 but ultimately 
concluded that “to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, a defendant should petition the appellate court that heard the 
appeal for a writ of habeas corpus.”63  While the court recognized that 
Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06 “was designed to supplant habeas 
corpus, the legislature has expressly recognized in the statute that 
[section] 974.06 may on occasion prove ‘inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality’ of a defendant’s detention.  In such circumstances, a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus may still be appropriate.”64  The 
Knight decision stressed the institutional competence that appellate 
courts have to decide claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel: “These determinations involve questions of law within the 
 
56.  Id. at 518.   
57.  Id. at 517–18.   
58.  Id. at 518.   
59.  Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1060 (D.C. 1987), cited in Knight, 168 Wis. 
2d at 518).   
60.  United States v. Winterhalder, 724 F.2d 109, 111 (10th Cir. 1983), cited in Knight, 
168 Wis. 2d at 518. 
61.  Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 518–19 (citing Hemphill v. State, 566 S.W.2d 200, 208 (Mo. 
1978)). 
62.  Id. at 519.   
63.  Id. at 520.   
64.  Id. (quoting WIS. STAT. § 974.06(8) (2013–2014)).   
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appellate court’s expertise and authority to decide de novo.  The 
appellate court will be familiar with the case and the appellate 
proceedings.”65  Should the court of appeals decide that further fact-
finding is needed to adjudicate a habeas claim, it has the statutory 
authority under Wisconsin Statutes section 752.39 “to submit the matter 
to a referee or to the circuit court for inquiry into counsel’s conduct, 
which may include the testimony of counsel and other evidence 
concerning appellate strategy.”66  While under this scenario a habeas 
petition with the court of appeals will take longer to adjudicate than 
would a section 974.06 motion with the circuit court, “in cases where no 
fact-finding is needed, the habeas corpus procedure will be faster.”67   
Knight is not without its detractors.  In State ex rel. Panama v. Hepp, 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (in a published per curiam opinion) 
criticized the Knight court’s conclusion that the court of appeals is in the 
best position to assess claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.68  The main problem with having such claims originate with the 
court of appeals instead of the circuit court is that additional factual 
findings are often required: 
[W]hile this court may deny a Knight petition whose allegations 
are insufficient on their face to warrant relief, we can never grant 
relief without first remanding the matter to the circuit court 
unless the State concedes error.  Thus, nearly all potentially 
meritorious Knight petitions are subjected to a cumbersome 
trifurcated process in which they are first submitted to this court, 
then referred to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing, and 
then returned to this court for a decision based upon the factual 
findings of the circuit court.  The result is a significant delay in 
the very cases in which relief is most likely warranted.69 
The court of appeals went on to note that “[c]ommon sense suggests 
that all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including appellate 
counsel, be initially addressed in the circuit court,” but lamented that it 
was bound by Knight.70 
 
65.  Id. at 521.   
66.  Id. 
67.  Id.  
68.  2008 WI App 146, ¶ 22, 314 Wis. 2d 112, 758 N.W.2d 806 (per curiam). 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. ¶ 25.   
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While I agree with the Hepp court’s criticism of the procedural 
problems caused by having ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claims originate in an appellate court rather than the trial court, it 
should be noted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
Knight holding in 2004,71 so the process is unlikely to change.   
C. Wisconsin Statutes Section 974.06 Governs Claims of Ineffective 
Assistance of Postconviction Counsel 
A question that Knight left unanswered was, “How does a defendant 
properly plead ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel?”  The 
court of appeals addressed this question in State ex rel. Rothering v. 
McCaughtry.72  Before discussing the holding of Rothering, I should 
briefly elucidate the difference between postconviction and appellate 
representation. 
Appellate representation consists of two functions: writing the brief 
and delivering oral argument.73  This is distinct from postconviction 
representation (sometimes called “postdisposition” representation), 
which refers to an attorney’s role in filing motions with the circuit court 
immediately after his client has been convicted and sentenced.  
Wisconsin Statute § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h) provides that “instead of, or as 
a prelude to, filing a notice of appeal, a person may file a motion for 
postconviction or postdisposition relief in the circuit court.”74  A 
defendant “shall file a motion for postconviction or postdisposition 
relief before a notice of appeal is filed” unless the basis for the appeal is 
the “sufficiency of the evidence” or an issue “previously raised.”75  As 
one treatise of Wisconsin appellate law has stated, 
[I]f appellate counsel concludes that the only issues to be raised 
on appeal are points that have previously been raised and 
rejected (for example, in a motion to dismiss; a motion for 
mistrial; or a request for, or objection to, a jury instruction), no 
postconviction or postdisposition motion need to be filed.  On 
the other hand, new issues such as newly discovered evidence, a 
 
71.  See State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶ 4, 273 Wis. 2d 192, 682 N.W.2d 784, abrogated on 
other grounds by State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶ 29, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 
N.W.2d 900.   
72.  205 Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).   
73.  Id. at 678–79 (citing Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1057 (D.C. 1987).  
74.  MICHAEL S. HEFFERNAN, APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN WISCONSIN 
§ 19.16 (5th ed. 2011) (citation omitted).   
75.  WIS. STAT. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h) (2013–2014). 
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challenge to the sentence, or an assertion that trial counsel was 
ineffective must be the subject of a postconviction or 
postdisposition motion before the appeal.76 
Filing postconviction motions with the circuit court serves two purposes.  
“First, it provides an opportunity to present issues to the circuit court 
that were not previously raised.  Second, it allows the circuit court a 
further opportunity to consider issues that were previously raised.”77 
Returning to the Rothering decision, after Aaron Rothering was 
convicted of seven criminal charges, he filed a direct appeal arguing his 
sentence was the result of an erroneous exercise of discretion.78  The 
same attorney handled both his trial and his appeal.79  The court of 
appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the supreme court 
denied his petition for review.80  Rothering subsequently filed a habeas 
petition with the court of appeals, arguing his attorney was ineffective in 
both his trial and appellate capacities.81  But because Rothering sought 
to invoke the court of appeals’ jurisdiction under Knight, the court 
limited itself “to consideration of whether he was deprived of the 
effective assistance of appellate counsel.”82 
Rothering faced a hurdle with his claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, though.  He averred that his appellate counsel should 
have argued that his trial counsel was ineffective (an awkward position 
given that it was the same attorney) and that he involuntarily entered a 
guilty plea.83  Rothering’s attorney, however, never filed a 
postconviction motion with the trial court on these two issues.84  This 
was significant because, as previously mentioned, Rule 809.30(2)(h) 
mandates that a defendant “shall file a motion for postconviction or 
postdisposition relief before a notice of appeal is filed unless the 
grounds for seeking relief are sufficiency of the evidence or issues 
previously raised.”85  In other words, because Rothering’s attorney did 
 
76.  HEFFERNAN, supra note 75, § 19.16. 
77.  Id. 
78.  State ex. rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 676, 556 N.W.2d 136, 137 
(Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam). 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. at 676–77. 
81.  Id. at 677. 
82.  Id. 
83.  See id. 
84.  See id. at 679. 
85.  WIS. STAT. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h) (2013–2014); see also id. § 974.02(2). 
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not preserve those issues with a motion for postconviction relief, he 
could not raise them on appeal.  As the court of appeals explained, 
What Rothering really complains of is the failure of 
postconviction counsel to bring a postconviction motion before 
the trial court to withdraw his plea and raising the issue of 
ineffective trial counsel.  The allegedly deficient conduct is not 
what occurred before this court but rather what should have 
occurred before the trial court by a motion filed by 
postconviction counsel.  We hold that a Knight petition is not the 
proper vehicle for seeking redress of the alleged deficiencies of 
postconviction counsel.86   
As a corollary to that conclusion, the court held that “a claim of 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel should be raised in the 
trial court either by a petition for habeas corpus or a motion under 
[Wisconsin Statutes section] 974.06.”87   
D. The Differences Between Postconviction and Appellate Counsel are 
Procedurally Significant 
The previous sections laid out the features of habeas corpus, 
Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06, postconviction proceedings, and 
criminal appellate representation.  This section will attempt to tie them 
together in a coherent whole to provide a useful guidepost. 
The differences between postconviction and appellate 
representation can be quite confusing, but the distinction is procedurally 
significant and one that defendants and defense attorneys should be 
cognizant of.  After a defendant is convicted and sentenced, he has the 
option of (1) filing a postconviction motion with the circuit court,88 (2) 
pursuing a direct appeal to the court of appeals,89 or (3) filing a motion 
for sentence modification with the circuit court.90  If the defendant elects 
to pursue postconviction relief, he has twenty days after sentencing to 
file his notice with the circuit court.91  Filing a postconviction motion 
does not bar a subsequent appeal; indeed, a postconviction motion is 
 
86.  Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 679.   
87.  Id. at 681.  Neither the Rothering court nor any subsequent appellate court decision 
has clarified when a habeas petition would be a more appropriate remedy than a § 974.06 
motion for a defendant alleging he received ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. 
88.  WIS. STAT. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b).  
89.  Id. § 809.30(2)(j). 
90.  Id. § 973.19. 
91.  Id. § 809.30(2)(b).   
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often necessary to preserve issues for appeal.92  For instance, a 
defendant “is not required to file a postconviction motion in the trial 
court prior to an appeal if the grounds are sufficiency of the evidence or 
issues previously raised.”93  In other words, when a defendant pursues an 
appeal of his conviction, he may raise only arguments related to the 
sufficiency of the evidence or issues that were previously raised, either 
during the trial or in a postconviction motion with the circuit court.94 
Of course, if a defendant elects to pursue a direct appeal without 
filing any postconviction motions with the circuit court, he can no longer 
file a postconviction motion under Rule 809.30(2)(b), as an appeal 
transfers jurisdiction from the circuit court to the court of appeals.95  If a 
defendant elects not to pursue postconviction relief, he has twenty days 
from entry of the sentence or final adjudication to file his notice of 
appeal with the circuit court.96 
While a defendant may file a postconviction motion and then pursue 
a direct appeal, a motion for sentence modification precludes him from 
filing a direct appeal or a subsequent postconviction motion under Rule 
809.30(2).97  Sentence modification is thus a separate avenue of relief 
and “not simply another piece of postconviction ammunition to be used 
in a never-ending assault on the conviction.”98  The sentence-
modification statute, which was created via supreme court order, is 
“aimed primarily at guilty-plea cases in which the only issue after 
sentencing normally will be whether the sentence was excessive.”99  
Because it “eliminate[s] a number of steps from the postconviction 
procedure,” opting for the sentence modification route is designed to be 
a “money-saver” for convicted defendants.100  A defendant has ninety 
days after sentencing to move for sentence modification.101   
 
92.  See id. § 809.30(2)(h).   
93.  Id. § 974.02(2); see also id. § 809.30(2)(h). 
94.  Cf. State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 677–78, 556 N.W.2d 136, 
137–38 (Ct. App. 1996) (“Claims of ineffective trial counsel or whether grounds exist to 
withdraw a guilty plea cannot be reviewed on appeal absent a postconviction motion in the 
trial court.”). 
95.  See id. at 677–78. 
96.  WIS. STAT. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(j) (2013–2014).   
97.  Id. § 973.19(5).   
98.  HEFFERNAN, supra note 75, § 19.17.   
99.  Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 973.19 Judicial Council Note, 1984 (2013–2014)). 
100.  Id. 
101.  WIS. STAT. § 973.19(1)(a). 
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After a defendant’s postconviction and appellate remedies have 
expired, he may file a Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06 motion with the 
circuit court.102  Perplexingly, although a section 974.06 motion is a 
collateral attack upon a defendant’s conviction, the statute is entitled 
“postconviction procedure.”103  A collateral attack is “[a]n attack on a 
judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal.”104  Many 
Wisconsin judicial opinions have thus used the phrase “postconviction 
motion” when referring to section 974.06 motions.105  To avoid confusion 
with postconviction motions under Rule 809.30, it would be more 
accurate and indeed salutary to refer to section 974.06 motions as 
“collateral motions” or simply “section 974.06 motions.”     
Where the difference between postconviction motions, direct 
appeals, and section 974.06 motions is most significant is in the right to 
counsel context.  While it is firmly established that the right to counsel 
goes beyond the trial and through a defendant’s first appeal,106 
Wisconsin also recognizes a right to counsel when filing postconviction 
motions.107  That right to counsel, though, does not extend to section 
974.06 motions.108  The distinction between an attorney providing 
postconviction as opposed to appellate representation is not merely 
 
102.  State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 677–81, 556 N.W.2d 136, 
137–39 (Ct. App. 1996). 
103.  Cf. State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶ 27 n.8, 273 Wis. 2d 192, 682 N.W.2d 784 (“[A] 
motion to collaterally attack a conviction under § 974.06 is commonly referred to as a 
postconviction motion.” (emphasis added)). 
104.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (10th ed. 2014) (“A petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus is one type of collateral attack.”).  
105.  See, e.g., State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, ¶¶ 33, 44, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756; State 
v. Braun, 185 Wis. 2d 152, 157, 159, 162, 516 N.W.2d 740, 742, 744 (1994); State v. Crockett, 
2001 WI App 235, ¶ 1, 248 Wis. 2d 120, 635 N.W.2d 673; State v. Tolefree, 209 Wis. 2d 421, 
425, 563 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Ct. App. 1997).   
106.  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396–97 (1985).   
107.  Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶ 27 (“A criminal defendant has a right to postconviction relief 
that encompasses both bringing a postconviction motion and an appeal.  The circuit court 
judge must inform the defendant at sentencing of these rights and the right to the assistance 
of the [State Public Defender] if he is indigent.” (citations omitted)).   
108.  State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 648–49, 579 N.W.2d 698, 713 
(1998) (“[A Section] 974.06 proceeding is considered to be civil in nature, and authorizes a 
collateral attack on a defendant’s conviction.  Defendants do not have a constitutional right to 
counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions . . . .” (citation omitted)).  
Note that the Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office has the discretion to appoint counsel 
in section 974.06 proceedings if it determines that “the case should be pursued.”  WIS. STAT. 
§ 977.05(4)(j) (2013–2014).  In deciding whether counsel should be appointed, the Public 
Defender’s Office “considers a number of factors, including the likelihood of success if 
counsel is appointed.”  HEFFERNAN, supra note 75, § 19.24.   
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academic and has significant procedural implications for a defendant 
arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  A claim of 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel must be filed with the 
circuit court, either as a section 974.06 motion or as a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus.109  A defendant arguing ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, conversely, may not seek relief under section 974.06 
and must instead petition the court of appeals for a writ of habeas 
corpus.110  A defendant is limited to one section 974.06 motion with the 
circuit court and one habeas petition with the court of appeals unless he 
can provide a “sufficient reason” as to why he did not raise a particular 
issue.111  Yet “unlike [section] 974.06 motions, a habeas petition under 
Knight is subject to the doctrine of laches because a petition for habeas 
corpus seeks an equitable remedy.”112 
It is often the case that the same attorney serves as both a 
defendant’s postconviction and appellate counsel.113  However, as claims 
of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel follow a different path 
than claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, lawyers and 
defendants must be precise about what form of ineffectiveness they are 
alleging.   
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WISCONSIN 
Despite the significant amount of litigation engendered by criminal 
convictions, new (and seemingly foundational) questions continue to 
emerge in the areas of criminal appellate, postconviction, and collateral 
litigation.  Recently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court grappled with two 
such issues: (1) the proper pleading standard for a defendant alleging 
that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise certain 
issues, and (2) whether a claim that postconviction counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction 
relief belongs in the circuit court or the court of appeals.  The answers to 
these two questions will now be discussed in turn.   
 
109.  State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 681, 556 N.W.2d 136, 139 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
110.  State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 520, 484 N.W.2d 540, 544 (1992).  
111.  See WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2013–2014); Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶ 35.  
112.  Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶ 35.   
113.  Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 678 n.4. 
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A. State v. Starks 
1. Background 
A case from the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 2012–2013 term 
revealed the procedural morass that can ensue when careful attention is 
not paid to the fine distinctions between postconviction and appellate 
counsel.  Tramell Starks was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide 
and being a felon-in-possession of a firearm as a result of Starks 
shooting Lee Weddle to death.114  “Following his convictions, the Public 
Defender’s Office appointed a new attorney, Robert Kagen, to 
represent Starks in his postconviction matters.  Kagen did not file any 
postconviction motions with the circuit court and instead pursued a 
direct appeal at the court of appeals . . . .”115  The court of appeals 
affirmed his convictions and the supreme court denied his petition for 
review.116 
His postconviction and appellate remedies drained, Starks filed a 
pro se Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06 motion with the circuit court, 
alleging that he received ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel 
because Attorney Kagen failed to raise numerous claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.117  Here is where the imbroglio unfolded.  The 
circuit court dismissed the motion for exceeding the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court rule on page length limit.118  Two days later, Starks filed a 
motion with the circuit court to vacate his assessed DNA surcharge 
pursuant to State v. Cherry (henceforth “Cherry motion”).119  The circuit 
 
114.  State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶ 1, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833 N.W.2d 146.   
115.  Id. ¶ 15. 
116.  Id. ¶ 20.   
117.  Id. ¶ 21.   
118.  Id.   
119.  All defendants (such as Starks) convicted of a felony are required to provide a 
DNA sample to the state crime laboratories as mandated by Wisconsin Statutes section 
973.047(1f).  Prior to the passage of the 2013–2014 state budget, unless the felony was sexual 
assault, the circuit court had discretion in deciding whether to impose a $250 DNA surcharge 
on the defendant.  See State v. Ziller, 2011 WI App 164, ¶ 9, 338 Wis. 2d 151, 807 N.W.2d 241.  
In State v. Cherry, 2008 WI App 80, ¶ 10, 312 Wis. 2d 203, 752 N.W.2d 393, the court of 
appeals held that a circuit court “must do something more than stat[e] it is imposing the DNA 
surcharge simply because it can.”  At the very least, a circuit court had to demonstrate that it 
went through a rational decision-making process.  See id. ¶¶ 10–11.  A motion challenging the 
circuit court’s discretion in imposing a DNA surcharge was known as a “Cherry motion.”  See 
Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶ 2.  The 2013 budget act, however, rewrote the statute such that now a 
court must impose a $250 DNA surcharge for each felony conviction and $200 for each 
misdemeanor conviction.  Act of June 30, 2013, 2013 Wis. Act 20, §§ 2353–55, 2013 Wis. Sess. 
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court denied the Cherry motion, reasoning that it was a motion to 
modify a sentence and hence had to be brought within ninety days after 
sentencing.120  Starks then refiled his section 974.06 motion within the 
local page limit requirement.121  Ultimately, the circuit court denied 
Starks’s section 974.06 motion on the merits as “not set[ting] forth a 
viable claim for relief with regards to trial counsel’s performance.”122  
Starks’s motion, however, should have been denied for an entirely 
different reason: he filed the wrong claim in the wrong court.123  Because 
Kagen did not file any postconviction motions with the circuit court and 
instead pursued a direct appeal, he was Starks’s appellate attorney, not 
his postconviction attorney.124  Thus, Starks’s only remedy was to file a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals; section 
974.06 was inapplicable.125  While the district attorney’s office could 
have sought dismissal, nothing in the record indicated that the State 
requested for Starks’s section 974.06 motion to be dismissed on these 
grounds.126 
When the case made its way to the court of appeals, the State (now 
represented by the Wisconsin Department of Justice)127 argued: 
“Attorney Kagen was Starks’s appellate counsel, and thus, to the extent 
that Starks is arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Starks has 
brought these claims in the wrong forum.”128  The court of appeals did 
not dismiss the case, reasoning, “Starks and the circuit court both make 
references to appellate counsel, possibly because the same attorney who 
handled the appeal would have been appointed to pursue any 
postconviction relief.  However, as the State correctly points out, a 
 
Laws 85, 637 (codified as ammended at Wis. Stat. § 976.046(1r) (2013–2014)).  For purposes 
of this Article, I will still use the term “Cherry motion.” 
120.  Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶ 21.   
121.  Id.   
122.  Id. ¶ 22 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
123.  Id. ¶ 30.   
124.  See id. ¶ 15.   
125.  Id. ¶ 30.   
126.  Id. ¶ 38.   
127.  The local district attorney’s office represents the State at trial and in one-judge 
appeals before the court of appeals, while the Department of Justice represents the State in 
three-judge appeals before the court of appeals and all cases before the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court.  See WIS. STAT. §§ 165.25(1), 752.31(4), 978.05(5) (2013–2014). 
128.  Brief and Supplemental Appendix of Plaintiff-Respondent at 19, State v. Starks, 
No. 2010AP425, 2011 WL 2314951 (Wis. Ct. App. June 14, 2011), 2010 WL 4633221 at *19. 
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challenge to appellate counsel’s performance does not belong in the 
circuit court.”129  This logic had it exactly backwards: the forum a 
defendant files in does not determine the nature of his claim; rather, the 
nature of his claim determines the forum he should file in.130  In any 
event, the court of appeals eventually held that Starks’s section 974.06 
motion was procedurally barred by Escalona-Naranjo because Starks 
could have raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his 
Cherry motions and failed to do so.131   
2. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Decision 
Because of the procedural errors made as the case wended its way 
through the appellate system,132 the first question the supreme court had 
to answer in Starks was whether it had jurisdiction to decide the case.  In 
an opinion by Justice Gableman, the court held that, because the 
procedural mistake spoke to the circuit court’s competency rather than 
its jurisdiction, the State forfeited its opportunity to seek dismissal, as it 
did not raise the issue before the circuit court.133  Moreover, the court 
stated, “We are also mindful of prudential concerns and the interests of 
judicial economy.  If we were to dismiss this case for want of 
jurisdiction, presumably Starks would simply refile his current claim 
 
129.  State v. Starks, No. 2010AP425, 2011 WL 2314951, ¶ 5 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. June 14, 
2011). 
130.  Cf. State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 678 n.4, 556 N.W.2d 
136, 138 n.4 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[W]e are not bound by the designations used in the 
appointment of counsel after a conviction.”).   
131.  Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶ 25. 
132.  Another procedural wrinkle in Starks was that Attorney Kagen never filed a 
postconviction motion with the circuit court alleging that Starks’s trial attorney was 
ineffective.  Id. ¶ 34.  When a defendant pursues an appeal of his conviction, he may only 
plead arguments related to the sufficiency of the evidence or issues that were previously 
raised, either during the trial or in a postconviction motion.  See WIS. STAT. § 974.02(2) 
(2013–2014); Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d at 677–78.  So because Kagen qua postconviction counsel 
did not file a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Kagen in 
his capacity as appellate counsel could not allege that trial counsel was ineffective.  However, 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can constitute a sufficient reason to excuse the 
failure to raise an issue prior to a direct appeal.  State v. Allen, 2010 WI 89, ¶ 29, 328 Wis. 2d 
1, 786 N.W.2d 124.  It is unclear how this issue could have been resolved, as the only way for 
Starks’s attorney before the supreme court to present this issue would have been to argue that 
Attorney Kagen as appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to allege that Attorney Kagen 
as postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to allege that Starks’s trial counsel was 
ineffective.  Paradoxically, it is thus arguably ineffective assistance of counsel for a 
postconviction attorney to not argue that trial counsel was ineffective, even if it is the same 
lawyer.   
133.  Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶¶ 36–38.   
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with the court of appeals, deleting the word ‘postconviction’ and 
replacing it with ‘appellate.’”134 
The court then settled into the two issues presented: (1) whether a 
Cherry motion counts as a prior motion under Wisconsin Statutes 
section 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo, and (2) what the proper 
pleading standard is for a defendant alleging that he received ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel because his attorney did not raise certain 
arguments.135   
On the first question, the court held that “a Cherry motion, or any 
sentence modification motion, plainly does not waive a defendant’s right 
to bring a [Wisconsin Statutes section] 974.06 motion at a later date.”136  
The court’s analysis was driven by its interpretation of the criminal 
appellate and postconviction statutes, which provide that “(1) a 
defendant who moves to modify his sentence pursuant to [Wisconsin 
Statutes section] 973.19(1)(a) renounces his right to a direct appeal and 
postconviction relief, and (2) [Wisconsin Statutes section] 974.06 motion 
is expressly not one of those forms of relief.”137  What is more, the court 
found it “implausible that a defendant would have to relinquish his 
statutorily-protected right to challenge his sentence in order to protect 
his future right to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in 
state court.”138  Finally, while “a Cherry motion must be made before a 
criminal conviction becomes final,” a section 974.06 motion “can be 
made only after ‘the time for appeal or postconviction remedy provided 
in [Wisconsin Statutes section 974.02] has expired.’”139  
The second question presented was the proper pleading standard an 
appellate court should apply when a defendant alleges he received 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because his attorney failed to 
raise certain arguments.140  Starks contended that all a defendant in such 
a position must do to demonstrate ineffectiveness “is to show that 
appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and that it prejudiced 
him.”141  Meanwhile, the State argued that a defendant “must also 
establish why the unraised claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
 
134.  Id. ¶ 39.   
135.  See id. ¶ 32.   
136.  Id. ¶ 49.   
137.  Id.  
138.  Id. ¶ 51.   
139.  Id. ¶ 52 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 974.06(1) (2013–2014)). 
140.  Id. ¶ 32. 
141.  Id. ¶ 56. 
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counsel were ‘clearly stronger’ than the claims that appellate counsel 
raised on appeal.”142  The court held that the State “articulated the 
proper standard.”143  
In examining the issue, the supreme court turned first to a decision 
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which held, 
When a claim of ineffective assistance of [appellate] counsel is 
based on failure to raise viable issues, the [trial] court must 
examine the trial record to determine whether appellate counsel 
failed to present significant and obvious issues on appeal.  
Significant issues which could have been raised should then be 
compared to those which were raised.  Generally, only when 
ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the 
presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.144 
This “clearly stronger” standard was adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court fourteen years later in Smith v. Robbins.145  There, the 
Court held that when a defendant alleges that his appellate counsel was 
deficient for not raising a particular claim, “it [will be] difficult to 
demonstrate that counsel was incompetent” because the defendant must 
show that “a particular nonfrivolous issue was clearly stronger than 
issues that counsel did present.”146   
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Starks also adopted the “‘clearly 
stronger’ pleading standard for the deficiency prong of the Strickland 
test in Wisconsin for criminal defendants alleging in a [Knight] habeas 
petition that they received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
due to counsel’s failure to raise certain issues.”147  As support for the 
“clearly stronger” pleading standard, the court cited the necessity of 
“finality in . . . litigation”148 as well as the need to “respect the 
professional judgment of postconviction attorneys in separating the 
wheat from the chaff.”149 
 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id.  
144.  Id. ¶ 57 (alteration in original) (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 
1986)). 
145.  528 U.S. 259 (2000).   
146.  Id. at 288 (emphasis added).   
147.  Starks, 2013 WI 69, ¶ 60. 
148.  Id. (quoting State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 185, 517 N.W.2d 157, 163 
(1994)). 
149.  Id. 
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The following term, the court logically extended the “clearly 
stronger” standard to claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel.150  As the court noted, the principle of finality is of such import 
that “not every mistake will justify relief.”151   
B. State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard 
1. Background 
During the 2013–2014 term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State 
ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard addressed the question of the proper forum to 
adjudicate a claim that a defendant’s postconviction counsel was 
ineffective for failing to timely file a notice of intent to pursue 
postconviction relief.152  Lorenzo Kyles pled guilty to first-degree 
reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to 
forty years imprisonment.153  When he initially met with his lawyer after 
sentencing, Kyles stated he was undecided about seeking postconviction 
or appellate relief.154  A few days later, he decided he wanted to 
appeal.155  However, Kyles was unable to get ahold of his lawyer until 
after the deadline to file a notice of appeal passed.156   
Kyles responded by filing a pro se Knight petition with the court of 
appeals seeking reinstatement of his right to appeal.157  In dismissing his 
petition, the court of appeals held that because Kyles’s attorney had 
never filed a notice of intent to seek relief, Kyles was actually denied 
effective assistance of postconviction counsel and hence had to seek 
relief in the circuit court.158  After his attempts at relief in the circuit 
court and in federal court proved unsuccessful, Kyles filed a pro se 
motion with the court of appeals seeking to extend the time for him to 
file a notice of intent to seek relief on the grounds that he simply could 
not get in touch with his lawyer during the twenty-day statutory 
 
150.  State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶ 46, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668.  
The court did caution, however, that this standard may not apply “when counsel has valid 
reasons for choosing one set of arguments over another.  These reasons may include the 
preferences, even the directives, of the defendant.”  Id.  
151.  Id. ¶ 31.   
152.  2014 WI 38, 354 Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805.   
153.  Id. ¶ 6.   
154.  Id. ¶ 7. 
155.  Id. ¶ 8.   
156.  Id. ¶¶ 8–10.   
157.  Id. ¶ 11.   
158.  Id. 
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window.159  The court of appeals denied the motion, concluding that 
Kyles had failed to show good cause for extending the deadline, as Kyles 
had previously failed to demonstrate to the circuit court that he actually 
told his attorney to file a notice of appeal.160  Imprisoned but unbowed, 
Kyles tried his luck one more time with a habeas petition to the court of 
appeals, again asking for an extension.161  Once again, the court of 
appeals denied his request on the basis that Kyles was trying to bring an 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim, which properly 
belonged in the circuit court.162   
2. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court took Kyles’s petition for review “to 
determine the appropriate forum and vehicle for relief for a defendant 
who asserts that the ineffectiveness of counsel resulted in a notice of 
intent to pursue postconviction relief not being filed.”163  The court 
acknowledged that there was “no precedent directly addressing the 
discrete procedural issue” presented.164  The state argued that under 
Knight and Rothering, Kyles’s petition should go to the circuit court, as 
that was where the alleged ineffectiveness occurred.165  In a unanimous 
opinion authored by Justice Bradley, the supreme court held that, 
because only the court of appeals could extend the twenty-day deadline 
to seek postconviction relief, Kyles was correct in seeking an extension 
from the court of appeals rather than the circuit court.166  The court 
stated, “[W]e determine that the court of appeals is the proper forum 
for claims of ineffectiveness premised on counsel’s failure to file a notice 
of intent.”167  
Having decided the proper forum, the court then moved to 
determining the appropriate procedure for a claim of ineffectiveness 
based on the failure of an attorney to file a notice of intent to pursue 
postconviction relief.168  The court held that, rather than bringing a 
 
159.  Id. ¶ 14.   
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. ¶ 15.   
162.  Id.   
163.  Id. ¶ 16.   
164.  Id. ¶ 19.   
165.  Id. ¶ 28.   
166.  Id. ¶ 32.   
167.  Id. ¶ 38.   
168.  Id. ¶ 39. 
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motion to enlarge time at the court of appeals under Wisconsin Statutes 
section 809.82(2), “in most circumstances a habeas petition is the 
appropriate procedure to follow.”169  This is so because “the complex 
legal issues involved and fact-intensive inquiry required by most 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the court of appeals requires 
the more thorough analysis provided by a Knight petition.”170 
Turning to the substance of his claim, the court held that Kyles 
alleged sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing.171  Noting 
that “the deprivation of counsel during an appeal is per se 
prejudicial,”172 the court held it would be “incongruous to state that a 
defendant was denied the right to counsel and then preclude the 
defendant from raising a claim because of errors made due to the 
absence of counsel.”173  Kyles’s petition was thus remanded to the court 
of appeals to either appoint a referee or refer to the circuit court for an 
evidentiary hearing.174 
The lesson from Starks and Kyles is that no matter how many times 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court plumbs the depths of this area of the law, 
unanswered procedural questions continue to emerge.  While perhaps 
not the quagmire it once was, the waters of criminal appellate, 
postconviction, and collateral litigation remain muddied.  Unfortunately 
for practitioners, the United States Supreme Court has just injected 
further uncertainty.   
VI. RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
In Douglas v. California, released on the same day in 1963 as Gideon 
v. Wainwright,175 the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel in his initial criminal 
appeal.176  Twenty-two years later in Evitts v. Lucey, the Court extended 
this right to encompass the effective assistance of appellate counsel.177  
Shortly after the Evitts decision, the Court cautioned that the 
constitutional right to counsel does not apply to defendants who are 
 
169.  Id.    
170.  Id. ¶ 44.   
171.  Id. ¶¶ 49, 59.   
172.  Id. ¶ 54.   
173.  Id. ¶ 56.   
174.  Id. ¶ 59.   
175.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).   
176.  Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).   
177.  469 U.S. 387, 396–97 (1985). 
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“mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions” because “the right 
to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no 
further.”178  For that reason, the Court has “rejected suggestions [to] 
establish a right to counsel on discretionary appeals.”179  Accordingly, 
even when a defendant has representation in state collateral 
proceedings, he may not allege that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.180 
Two recent opinions by the Court, however, raise questions over 
whether the right to effective assistance of counsel is expanding beyond 
the trial and first appeal, and into state collateral proceedings.  These 
holdings, and their implications for Wisconsin law, will now be 
discussed.   
A. Martinez v. Ryan 
Martinez dealt with the question of “whether a prisoner has a right 
to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first 
occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”181  In Arizona, 
a convicted defendant may not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel on direct appeal but instead can only raise the claim in a 
separate collateral proceeding.182  Luis Martinez was convicted of two 
counts of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen.183  A new 
attorney was appointed to handle Martinez’s appeal.184  While the direct 
appeal was pending, the appointed counsel filed a motion for collateral 
relief with the state trial court.185  No allegations of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel were raised in the collateral motion, and the attorney 
filed a statement saying she could find no colorable claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.186  The trial court gave Martinez a chance to 
respond to his attorney’s collateral motion and raise any claims he 
 
178.  Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). 
179.  Id. 
180.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991).   
181.  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).   
182.  Id. at 1313.   
183.  Id.  
184.  Id. at 1314.   
185.  Id.  Arizona refers to their collateral proceedings as “postconviction” proceedings, 
but I will use the term “collateral” to avoid the confusion I have described throughout this 
Article.   
186.  Id. 
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thought his lawyer overlooked.187  Martinez did not respond and the trial 
court dismissed the collateral motion.188  On direct appeal, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the state supreme court 
denied review.189   
Over a year later, Martinez (now represented by a new attorney) 
filed a second collateral motion with the Arizona trial court, this time 
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.190  The trial court denied 
his motion, holding that Martinez was required to raise this issue in his 
first collateral motion.191  The court of appeals agreed and the Arizona 
Supreme Court again denied his petition for review.192   
His state remedies having evaporated, Martinez turned to the 
federal system for succor, filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
with the district court, once again alleging ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.193  Martinez acknowledged that he procedurally defaulted194 on 
this claim by not raising it in his original collateral motion, but argued he 
had a legitimate excuse: his first collateral review attorney was 
ineffective.195  The district court denied the petition and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.196 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and proceeded to carve out a 
tiny exception to the rule that there is no right to counsel in state 
collateral proceedings.197  When a state (such as Arizona) provides that 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can only be raised in 
collateral proceedings and not in a direct appeal, a defendant’s failure to 
raise such a claim in the initial collateral proceedings “will not bar a 
federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was 
 
187.  Id. 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. 
193.  Id.   
194.  The “procedural-default doctrine” holds that “a federal court lacks jurisdiction to 
review the merits of a habeas corpus petition if a state court has refused to review the 
complaint because the petitioner failed to follow reasonable state-court procedures.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1397 (10th ed. 2014).   
195.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314–15.   
196.  Id. at 1315.   
197.  See id. at 1320.   
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no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.”198  Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion was littered with qualifiers, such as the warning that 
the Court’s holding “does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of 
proceedings, including appeals from initial-review collateral 
proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions 
for discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts.”199  In addition, the 
Martinez holding “does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding 
beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial, even though that initial-review collateral 
proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.”200 
Justice Scalia—joined by Justice Thomas—wrote a biting dissent.201  
Justice Scalia accused the Court of reaching its result for “equitable” 
reasons and effectively inventing “a new constitutional right to 
collateral-review counsel.”202  He also warned that the holding was not 
limited to ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel claims (as the majority 
insisted) and would soon apply to other situations where state collateral 
proceedings provided the first opportunity to raise certain issues, such as 
“claims of ‘newly discovered’ prosecutorial misconduct, . . . claims based 
on ‘newly discovered’ exculpatory evidence or ‘newly discovered’ 
impeachment of prosecutorial witnesses, and claims asserting ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel.”203  As Justice Scalia rhetorically asked, 
Is there any relevant difference between cases in which the State 
says that certain claims can only be brought on collateral review 
and cases in which those claims by their nature can only be 
brought on collateral review, since they do not manifest 
themselves until the appellate process is complete?204 
B. Trevino v. Thaler  
The door leading to the constitutional right to collateral counsel that 
Martinez pried open was kicked in a little more the following term in 
Trevino v. Thaler.205  A Texas jury convicted Carlos Trevino of capital 
 
198.  Id.   
199.  Id.  
200.  Id.   
201.  Id. at 1321–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  To be sure, it is perhaps redundant to refer 
to a Scalia dissent as “biting.”   
202.  Id. at 1321. 
203.  Id. 
204.  Id. at 1322 n.1.   
205.  133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).   
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murder and the judge sentenced him to death.206  A new attorney was 
appointed to handle Trevino’s direct appeal.207  In accordance with 
Texas’s criminal procedural rules, a second new attorney was appointed 
to seek state collateral relief while the direct appeal was pending.208  
Each of Trevino’s attorneys raised claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel; however, appellate counsel “did not claim that Trevino’s 
trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective during the penalty 
phase of the trial court proceedings,” while the attorney handling the 
collateral motion “did not include a claim that trial counsel’s 
ineffectiveness consisted in part of a failure adequately to investigate 
and to present mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase of 
Trevino’s trial.”209  His convictions were eventually affirmed in both the 
direct appeal and the collateral review.210   
Trevino then moved for habeas relief in federal district court.211  Yet 
another new attorney was appointed, who at this point raised an 
argument that Trevino’s appellate and collateral attorneys failed to 
make: “Trevino had not received constitutionally effective counsel 
during the penalty phase of his trial in part because of trial counsel’s 
failure to adequately investigate and present mitigating circumstances 
during the penalty phase.”212  The district court denied Trevino’s habeas 
petition, holding that he defaulted on his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claim because he did not raise it in his state collateral 
proceedings.213  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.214 
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, began by reciting the facts and 
holding of Martinez, then noted one critical factual distinction between 
the criminal appellate procedures of Arizona and Texas: “Unlike 
Arizona, Texas does not expressly require the defendant to raise a claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in an initial collateral review 
proceeding.  Rather Texas law on its face appears to permit (but not 
 
206.  Id. at 1915.   
207.  Id.   
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. (emphasis omitted).   
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. at 1916.  Again, although the Trevino opinion used “collateral” and 
“postconviction” interchangeably, I will exclusively use “collateral” to avoid any confusion 
with Wisconsin’s postconviction proceedings.   
214.  Id. 
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require) the defendant to raise the claim on direct appeal.”215  Whether 
Martinez’s limited exception to the rule that there is no right to counsel 
in state collateral proceedings would apply to the facts of Trevino 
depended on whether the difference between Texas’s and Arizona’s 
systems “matter[ed].”216 
In holding that Martinez applied and Trevino was thus forgiven for 
not raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct 
appeal, the Court zeroed in on two key facts: (1) the rules of Texas 
criminal procedure make it “‘virtually impossible for appellate counsel 
to adequately present an ineffective assistance [of trial counsel] claim’ 
on direct review,”217 and (2) it would be “significant[ly] unfair[]” not to 
apply Martinez because “Texas courts in effect have directed defendants 
to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on collateral, 
rather than on direct, review.”218  Without getting into the minutiae of 
Texas criminal appellate procedure, the reason it is “virtually 
impossible” to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a direct 
appeal is because of sharp filing deadlines and because collateral review 
litigation proceeds concurrently with a defendant’s direct appeal.219  
Ergo, the differences between Arizona’s and Texas’s systems for raising 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel amounted to “a distinction without 
a difference.”220  The Court ended with a cryptic caveat: “[W]e do not 
(any more than we did in Martinez) seek to encourage States to tailor 
direct appeals so that they provide a fuller opportunity to raise 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims.  That is a matter for States 
to decide.”221  
While Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented for the same reasons as 
they did in Martinez,222 they were joined in dissent this time by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.223  Writing for himself and Justice 
Alito, the Chief Justice decried that the Court was already crossing over 
 
215.  Id. at 1918.  
216.  Id. 
217.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2000)).   
218.  Id. at 1919.   
219.  See generally id. at 1918–20.   
220.  Id. at 1921.   
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222.  See id. at 1924 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
223.  Id. at 1921 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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the “crisp limit” it laid down in Martinez.224  Additionally, he observed 
that the “questions raised” by the majority’s decision “are as endless as 
will be the state-by-state litigation it takes to work them out.”225  Indeed, 
in reading Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, one gets the sense that he and 
Justice Alito felt hoodwinked by Justice Kennedy’s promise in Martinez 
that “[t]he holding in [that] case does not concern attorney errors in 
other kinds of proceedings,”226 and that if they had to do it over, they 
probably would not have joined the Martinez opinion. 
C.  Martinez’s and Trevino’s Implications for  
Wisconsin Criminal Procedure 
There are two ways one can read the Martinez and Trevino 
decisions.  The first is that these cases are to be construed narrowly and 
only apply to states like Arizona and Texas that do not afford a 
defendant a “meaningful opportunity” to raise ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claims on direct appeal.  Under this view, those decisions 
would not touch a hair upon the head of Wisconsin’s criminal litigation 
system, as Wisconsin Statutes section 974.06(4) and Esacalona-Naranjo 
preclude a defendant from saving issues for a collateral section 974.06 
motion that could have been raised in a postconviction motion or on 
direct appeal.227   
Another interpretation—and one consistent with the admonitions in 
Justice Scalia’s Martinez dissent—is that a defendant has a right to 
counsel in collateral proceedings anytime he raises a constitutional claim 
that could not have been raised on direct appeal.  This would apply, 
most significantly, to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  Because ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, by 
definition, cannot reveal itself until the appellate process is complete, a 
defendant’s first opportunity to raise such a claim would be in his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the court of appeals.  If 
Martinez and Trevino are read broadly, and if the right to effective 
appellate counsel is considered as sacred as the right to effective trial 
counsel, then one could deduce that criminal defendants in Wisconsin 
have a right to counsel when filing Knight petitions. 
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Under Martinez and Trevino, it would seem that an enterprising 
felon looking to attack his appellate lawyer’s competency could raise the 
following incontrovertible syllogism: (1) I have a right to a lawyer on 
appeal, just as I did at trial; (2) I have a right to an effective lawyer on 
appeal; (3) my appellate lawyer was ineffective; (4) now is the first time 
I can challenge my appellate lawyer’s effectiveness; (5) I am 
constitutionally entitled to a lawyer in my Knight petition.  Q.E.D.  
Leaving aside my reservations about Martinez and Trevino, I think that 
the fairest reading of those cases is that criminal defendants in 
Wisconsin are now constitutionally entitled to a lawyer when filing a 
habeas petition for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.   
VII.CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article was to be instructive rather than theoretical.  
It is my hope to have clarified some of the fine distinctions between 
appellate counsel, postconviction counsel, petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus, and collateral proceedings under Wisconsin Statutes section 
974.06.  While the differences may seem contrived or overly formalistic, 
there are significant consequences to defendants and their lawyers who 
confuse the subjects, particularly when raising ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims.  As Dean Eisenberg warned defense attorneys practicing 
in this area of law over forty years ago, “It is the duty of counsel to 
make certain that the remedy fits the crime.”228  Just so today. 
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